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COMMENTARIES
PREGNANCY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE COURT AT THE CROSSROADS*
The technological revolution of the twentieth century has had a dramatic

and somewhat paradoxical impact upon life in America.1 Although allowing
an extremely high standard of living, it has also threatened the continued existence of civilization, through either nuclear holocaust or environmental
pollution. An equally terrifying result of this revolution is the increased governmental ability to regulate through electronic devices the most private
aspects of the individual's daily existence.2 In 1928, faced with the novel
"seizure" of information by wiretapping, Justice Brandeis argued that Americans possessed a "right to be let alone."3 "Subtler and more far-reaching means
of invading privacy," he said, "have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosures in court of
what is whispered in the closet." 4 Since that time the possibilities of a practically omnipotent and omniscient central government have greatly increased,
and the importance of an independent right of privacy has grown proportionately. This commentary will evaluate the right of privacy as it exists today,
with particular reference to the recent decision in Roe v. Wade5 and its effect
on the source of the right and the standards and scope of its application.
BACKGROUND

The right of privacy, as such, first arose in the context of private law as

the direct result of an influential law review article written by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis.6 Originally designed to discourage objectionable media
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This commentary received the University of Florida Law Review Alumni
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the winter
1973 quarter.
1. "The medium, or process, of our time - electric technology - is reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal life." M. McLuHAN & Q. FIoRE, THE MEDIUM ISTHE MASSAGE 8 (1967). This has been called the "most
rapid and deep-going technological revolution in history." A. ToFrFrR, FUTURE SHOCK 186
(1970).
2. Marshall McLuhan, for example, has observed: "Electric information devices for
universal, tyrannical womb-to-tomb surveillance are causing a very serious dilemma between
our claim to privacy and the community's need to know. . . . We have already reached a
point where remedial control . . . must be exerted." M. MCLUHAN & Q. FIOR, supra note 1,
at 12 (emphasis added). See also G. ORwELL, 1984 6-7 (1949), where the author envisages a
world where "[y]ou had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct - in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement
scrutinized."
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 473.

5. 40 U.S. 113 (1973).
6.

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). This article
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practices, 7 the right has been continually expanded to include a wide variety
of other interests. 8 In the field of constitutional law, a number of early cases
relied on an interpretation of fourteenth amendment "liberty," which closely
resembles the modern right of privacy. It was determined, for example, that
there were areas of private life in which the government possessed no interest
and into which it could not intrude without some justification. 9 Although
these "regions of privacy" were indistinct, they seemed to encompass certain
rights to familial privacy ° and physical integrity.". Understandably, though,
the right became most closely associated with the field of criminal procedure 2
appearing at times to be little more than an adjunct to the fourth and fifth
amendments. 3
The culmination of this approach came in the landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 where the Court struck down a statute forbidding the
use of contraceptive devices as violative of the right of privacy. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, and that emanations from penumbras of the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments create zones of privacy.'5 The
totality of these zones was said to constitute a "right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights."' 6 Although this was the first recognition of an independent
right of privacy, the opinion did not attempt to define it, applying it only to
the facts of the case and leaving future extensions uncertain." Although con-

has been called the "outstanding illustration of the influence of legal periodicals upon the
courts." W. PRossER, TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 194-96.
8. The late Dean Prosser categorized the tort right into four distinct groups: (1) appropriation, (2) intrusion, (3) public disclosure of private facts, and (4) placing the plaintiff
in a false light. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 804-14.
9. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where the Court discusses
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," determining that it was not "the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property."
10. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1943) (right of procreation); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922)
(right to bring up and educate children).
11. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1943); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250 (1901).
12. Something akin to a right of privacy was ennunciated in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), where narcotics seized after pumping the defendant's stomach were ruled
inadmissible as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. See also Griswold, The Right
To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
13. Beaney, The Constitutional Right of Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 S. CT. REv.
211 (1962).
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. Id. at 484.
16. Id. at 486.
17. Although some courts interpreted the Griswold right broadly, the consensus of both
courts and legal writers was that the right inhered only in the marital relationship. See
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and
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curring in the result, other Justices preferred to rest the right more squarely
upon the ninth amendment,:" fourteenth amendment due process, 19 or four20
teenth amendment "liberty."
The cautiousness of the Court's approach, however, seemed to indicate
lack of commitment to a broad right of privacy among the Justices, or at least
some of them.2 The competing rationales as to the source of the right, for
example, could easily be regarded as a reflection of disagreement as to its
the Connecticut statute had been termed an
nature as well. 22 Furthermore,
"uncommonly silly law," 23 and even its one-time sponsors had abandoned it.24
Consequently, when the Court invalidated it as an infringement upon the
novel right of privacy, it seemed possible that a hard case had forced the recognition of an individual right that would not be readily protected. 25 The right
of privacy ennunciated in Griswold remained, at least to writers, "amorphous" 20 and "undefined."27 Although the Court had not restricted its future
options, neither had it assured the continued existence of the right.
The status of the Griswold right was further challenged by the Court's
refusal to utilize it in subsequent years. Although first and fourth amendment
rights of privacy were reaffirmed in dramatic fashion, 28 arguments employing
the independent right met a generally cool reception.2s Thus, in Powell v.

the Constitution, 25 U. Mi~mI L. Rv. 395, 401 (1971). The uncertainty as to the nature of
the right is typified by the plaintive remark in Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835, 848
(E.D. Tenn. 1966) (Darr, J., concurring): "[I]t is apparent that the right of privacy is constitutionally protected. It is the when and how which create the problems."
18. 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
21. Justice White, for example, seized upon a concession made by counsel for Connecticut
at oral arguments, which stated that the purpose of the statute was to prevent pre-marital
sex, an obviously invalid goal in that the statute did not distinguish between married and
unmarried persons. Consequently, his actual position on the right of privacy was unclear
despite his separate opinion. See Emerson, Nine justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Micx.

L.

REv. 219 (1965).
22. It has been convincingly argued from a historical basis that the Douglas and Goldberg opinions in Griswold reflect entirely different theories of interpretation despite their
apparent similarity. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implications for Republican Form of Government, 40 Tum. L. Rav. 487 (1966).

23. 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24. Emerson, supra note 21, at 219.
25. Cf. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. Rxv. 235 (1965).
26. Gunther, Forewdrd:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HaRv. L. Rav. 1, 29 (1972).

27. Doss & Doss, supra note 17, at 401.
28. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment protects the "mere private
possession" of obscene material); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (intrusion upon
a reasonable expectation of privacy in making a search will render that search illegal).
29. But cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), where the Court termed marriage
one of the "basic civil rights of man," a right analogous to and perhaps dependent upon
the right of privacy. See also Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom To Many, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 358 (1968).
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Texas30 the legislature's power to punish the "victimless crime" of public
drunkenness was approved against a claimed invasion of privacy. Similarly,
a New York Bar Association "Good Character Affidavit," which asked the
affiant whether and how often he had visited the applicant's home, was upheld,31 with Justice Black declaring that "it borders on the frivolous to say
that such an inquiry offends the applicant's right of privacy." 2 Then, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,33 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute forbidding
the distribution34 of contraceptive devices to unmarried persons without relying upon the right of privacy. Although counsel for neither side had argued
the issue of equal protection,3 5 Justice Brennan "in his eagerness to sidestep
the Griswold question"3 6 based his decision on that ground.3 Somewhat out
38
of context, however, the Court tangentially observed:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried
persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the
right of privacy inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
It appears, therefore, that the Eisenstadt decision, though decided without
resort to the right of privacy, indicates that the right is not solely based upon
the "sanctity of the marital bedchamber," but is instead an individual and
personal right.
Roe v. Wade AND

THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION

Any doubt that existed as to the vitality of the right of privacy, however,
was necessarily dispelled by the ruling in Roe v. Wade.39 There, the Court
30. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
31. Law Students Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
32. Id. at 160.
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. In Griswold the question of a law regulating the manufacture or the sale of contraceptives, as opposed to one regulating their use, was left open. 381 U.S. at 485.
35. Gunther, supra note 26, at 30.
36. Id. at 36.
37. The mental gymnastics utilized in arriving at this result have been severely criticized
by Professor Gunther. The Court, for example, first had to determine that the purpose of
the statute was neither to prevent illicit sexual behavior nor to protect the health of the
mother, but simply to prevent contraception. Such an in-depth study of legislative intent is
relatively rare, and this would seem to indicate the Court's uneasiness. Id. See also The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term- Right To Use and Distribute Contraceptives, 86 HARv. L. Rv.
116 (1972).

38. 405 U.S. at 453.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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considered a Texas abortion statute that had been in force for over a century
and that prohibited all abortions unless necessary to save the life of the
mother.4 0 Before ruling on the statute, the Court, through Justice Blackmun,
undertook a lengthy discussion of the historical, scientific, and medical data
that had been presented to the Court. From this it was decided that a pregnant
woman had a broader right to an abortion at common law than under most
contemporary state laws, 41 and that the medical hazards of a promptly per42
formed abortion have virtually disappeared.

Proceeding on these findings, the Court declared that "the right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty, as we feel it is, or in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." 43 Although not unqualified, 4 this right of
privacy is fundamental, and a compelling state interest is necessary to allow a
state to restrict it.4 The Court then determined that the state's interest in the
woman's health permited only restrictions commensurate with the danger involved,40 and that the interest in the potentiality of human life did not become
7
compelling until the fetus became viable.4
A more useful opinion for analytical purposes, and the first to attempt to
delineate the right of privacy, is the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas,48
which covers both Wade and its companian case, Doe v. Bolton.49 First commenting on the source of the right, Justice Douglas declared that the ninth
amendment does not create federally enforceable rights, although many of the
rights reserved to the people are properly enforceable through the fourteenth
amendment's concept of ordered liberty."0 These rights may be placed in three
categories: (1) the right to develop one's personality, intellect, and interests;
(2) the right to make the basic decisions of life respecting marriage, divorce,

40. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§1191-94 (1961).
41. "It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with
less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect:' 410 U.S. at 140.
42. Id. at 149.
43. Id. at 153.
44. "[A]ppellants and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she
is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever
reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree." Id.
45. Id. at 155, 156.
46. For the first trimester, therefore, the Court held that the decision must be left entirely to the woman and her doctor. For the second trimester, the state may require medical
precautions similar to those used for other surgical operations. Id. at 163; Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
47. "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. . . .With respect to the State's important
and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling point' is at viability." 410 US. at 162.
48. 410 U.S. 209 (1973).
49. 410 US. 179 (1973).
50. 410 US. at 210, 211.
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procreation, contraception, and the rearing of children; and (3) the right to
care for one's health and person and to be free from bodily restraint and compulsion. 51 The first of these is, according to Justice Douglas' view of first
amendment rights, an absolute right, while the latter two are fundamental
rights and may be restricted for a compelling reason.52 By extending the right
of privacy beyond the facts of the case, the Douglas opinion takes an important
step in creating a viable and enduring right of privacy.
Although the Wade decision does little to define the right of privacy (apart
from the Douglas opinion), it does indicate a judicial cohesiveness not apparent in Griswold. Seven Justices, for example, were willing to ground the
right in the fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty and to approve its
extension to include the right to an abortion. Nor were the statutes involved
in Wade and Bolton the "uncommonly silly laws" that the Connecticut statute
in Griswold was. On the contrary, the Bolton statute closely followed the
model statute endorsed by the American Law Institute, 53 and even the Texas
statute in Wade had vigorous support.5 4 Consequently, by uniting the Court in
the recognition and application of the right of privacy, Wade permits, for the
first time, a relatively intensive examination of that right.
THE SOURCE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Since the right of privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, it must be
accorded protection as a non-enumerated right by inclusion within some
specific constitutional provision. The possible sources for the right seem to be
(1) the ninth amendment, (2) the penumbras of specific constitutional guarantees, (3) the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, or
(4) the concept of ordered liberty used in substantive due process.
The ninth amendment states that the "enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."55 Although urged as the source of fundamental, non-enumerated
rights, 56 it was not until Griswold, and more prominently the Goldberg opinion in that case, that the ninth amendment was actually used for that purpose.517 Since then, however, the Court has not been particularly receptive to

51.
52.

Id. at 211-13.
Id.

53. This is printed in full in the Appendix to Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 202 (1973).
54. Several lower federal courts had upheld statutes practically indentical to that of
Texas. E.g., Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La.
1970). For an impassioned defense of the Texas type of abortion statute see Comment,
Abortion -A Legal Cop Out, 7 N.E.L. REv. 311 (1972).
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
56. See Moore, The Ninth Amendment -Its
Origins and Meaning, 7 N.E.L. REv. 215

(1972).
57.

Justice Black, for example, speaks of the "recent discovery" of the ninth amendment

in his dissent in Griswold. 381 U.S. at 509.
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ninth amendment arguments, 58 and even under the Goldberg approach its
usefulness is open to question. 9 In determining which rights are retained, for
example, Justice Goldberg could do no better than suggest the old test for
substantive due process (that is, whether the right is "so rooted in the tradi60
tions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental").
In addition, it has been suggested that rights under the ninth amendment
must have been in existence at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
since only retained rights are protected.61 Although the Court had no difficulty declaring that a right of marital privacy existed at that time, the similar
existence of a right to an abortion has not been established. 62 The Court was
consequently reluctant to base its decision on this rather unsteady foundation.
A second alternative was to find a penumbral right of privacy, similar to
that of Griswold, although this solution also posed serious problems. Penumbral rights that exist today, such as the freedom of association,63 have been
tied to only one amendment of the Bill of Rights. In contrast, the Griswold
right was tied to five separate and quite different amendments, and the administration of such a right might be unwieldy.64 Moreover, a truly independent right of privacy would be less likely to arise from the emanations of
specific rights than from the less restrictive concept of ordered liberty.
The privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment65 is
mentioned only in passing. Since the Slaughterhouse Cases rejected the use of
this clause in 1873,66 it has played no significant role in constitutional law.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested as the source of the right of privacy -an
"unfilled glass," which the Court could rely upon rather than the less pliable
due process and equal protection clauses.67 Although the Slaughterhouse Cases
appear erroneous in light of the legislative intent behind the privileges or
immunities clause,68 there is no indication that the Court is currently disposed
to overrule them.

58. E.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (ninth
amendment treated as rule of construction that cannot give rise to federally enforceable

rights).
59. Emerson, supra note 21, at 226.
60. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1905).
61. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment
Right About To Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth Century Common Law Right?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971).
62. Id. at 337.
63. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
64. The question must be raised, for example, whether cases interpreting all five amendments would be of precedential value and authority for the right of privacy. Since the first
amendment occupies a preferred position, for example, it might be argued that the right of
privacy also is a preferred right.
65. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
67.

Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last?;"

1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 405 (1972).
68. See id. at 406-08.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

7

Florida
Review,
Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1973], Art.[Vol.
6 XXV
UNIVERSITY
OF Law
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
In abandoning the elaborate conceptual framework that it had erected in
Griswold and utilizing the doctrine of substantive due process, the Wade Court
belied earlier indications of distaste for anything approaching judicial legislation. In Furman v. Georgia,69 for example, the four Nixon appointees would
have upheld the death penalty on the ground that the Court should not consider the efficacy of punishments deemed necessary by the legislature. This
somewhat narrow view of the scope of judicial review might have been expected to be carried over to the abortion decision, especially considering the
Court's reluctance to use substantive due process.7 1 To many Justices of the
Burger Court, due process carries a "repulsive connotation of value laden
intervention."' 2 Thus, Justice Wqhite has noted a judicial "allergy" to substantive due process 73 and, in Eisenstadt, Chief Justice Burger spoke disparagingly of the "heyday of substantive due process."' 4 Although any prediction
of the Burger Court's attitude toward constitutional construction is still premature, the Wade decision indicates that it is not adverse to exercising broad
powers where necessary, a factor that bodes well for an expanded right of
privacy.
The very brevity of the Court's discussion of the source of the right of
privacy, however, discourages any undue emphasis upon it.75 Most importantly,
the Court, by utilizing the concept of ordered liberty, has founded the right
of privacy in the Constitution and freed itself to proceed with the far more
essential task of defining the right.
THE STANDARD OF APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT

Under Griswold the test that the state was required to meet in order to
justify interference with the right of marital privacy was not specified.76 In
Wade, however, the Court clearly demanded a compelling state interest, a test

69. 408 U.S. 238, 396 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. "It is for the legislature to determine the balance, i.e., that point between prevention
of conception and the viability of the fetus which would give the state the compelling subordinating interest so that it may regulate or prohibit abortion without violating the individual's constitutionally protected rights." Clark, Religion, Morality and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal,2 U. LoYoLA (L.A.) L. REv. 1 (1969).
71. The Supreme Court has virtually abandoned economic substantive due process,
though it has never done so for civil liberties protected by that clause. Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S. CT. REv. 34 (1962). In Griswold, too, the argument of
substantive due process had been central to appellant's case, yet only Justice White fully
relied upon it. Emerson, supra note 21, at 222.
72. Gunther, supra note 26, at 42.
73. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
74. 405 U.S. 438, 467 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. "The precise source of the right of privacy is not as important as the fact that six
Justices found such a right to exist, and thereby established it for the first time as an independent constitutional right." Emerson, supra note 21, at 229.
76. The Court could not even find any rational basis for the statute and was thus not
forced to rule on the standard to be used.
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more traditionally associated with the equal protection clause than with due
process. 7 7 Lower courts, however, had required a compelling interest in applying the Griswold right,78 and commentators were generally in favor of this
transposition.7 9 In dissent, however, Justice Rehnquist declared that use of the
more stringent compelling test would result in a closer examination of legislative policies and a consequent judicial usurpation of the legislative function.80
Although this position is not without merit to proponents of strict construction, it would unduly hamper the development of a strong and independent
right of privacy. By requiring that the state show a compelling state interest,
rather than have the citizen show a lack of rational connection, the test, in
effect, shifts the burden of proof from the citizen to the state when governmental action is contested. This, of course, greatly increases the efficacy of the
right by disallowing the state's reliance upon any presumption of validity to
justify invasions of privacy.8 '
THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The scope of the right of privacy is subject to only general constitutional
and linguistic limitations. Constitutionally, the courts need only determine
that the aspect of the right involved is fundamental,2 and linguistically they
possess considerable discretion, since the right of privacy is almost inherently
incapable of precise definition. 83 The resultant flexibility, however, is immensely important in the formation of an adaptable safeguard of individual
liberties. Since our system of constitutional government is based upon a de-

77. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
78. E.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
79. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 U. LOYOLA
(L.A.) L. REv. 1, 9 (1969); Commentary, The Florida Abortion Law -Reform or Regression
in 1972?, 24 U. FA. L. REv. 346 (1972).
80. 410 U.S. 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. "[I]f upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary
birth control by married persons is valid, then, a law requiring compulsory birth control also
would seem to be valid." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
82. See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
83. "Few concepts . . . are more vague or less amenable to definition and structured
treatment than privacy. Under this emotional term march a whole congeries- of interests,
some closely interrelated, some almost wholly unrelated and even inconsistent." Dixon, The
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MiCH. L.
Rxv. 197, 199 (1965). Some of the definitions that have been given are: "[The right of
privacy] is, simply stated, the right to be let alone; to live one's life as one chooses, free
from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of
community living under a government of law." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (1967)
(Fortas, J., dissenting). "The right of privacy is the right of the individual to exist and act
in accordance with his own conscience, free from governmental interference so long as he
does not harm others ....
It is the right of every person to be himself and to perform the
myriad of daily acts that make up his own identity." Doss & Doss, supra note 17, at 418-19.
In addition, Justice Clark has spoken of a right of privacy protecting a "person's marriage,
home, children, and day-to-day living habits." Clark, supranote 79, at 8.
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cision that governmental powers should be limited by the existence of individual rights, 4 new devices for extending these powers must be countered
by stringent enforcement of the right of privacy - a judicial function necessary
to maintain the balance between citizen and state that the founding fathers
desired.
Although Griswold apparently created a separate right of marital privacy, 5
the subsequent decisions of Eisenstadt and Wade demonstrate that this is but
one aspect of a broader right of personal privacy.8, Since all three cases have
dealt with matters of intimate sexual concern (contraception and childbirth),
it appears that the right is firmly established only in this area. Nevertheless,
Wade does broaden the scope of the right by extending it to cover elements of
the physician-patient relationship. To have enforced the Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, it would have been necessary to permit
police inquiry into the most private of all human relationships. In contrast,
the abortion decision does not involve a relationship between husband and
wife, but between physician and patient. Although this distinction is important, its application to nonsexual matters, or to other professional relationships,

7

remains uncertain.

Thus far, therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized a personal right of
privacy that disallows unwarranted state interference with the use of contraceptives,8s procreation, 9 childbirth, 90 and the education and upbringing of
children. 91 The right is not absolute, however, and existence of a compelling
state interest will justify intrusion. 92 In this regard, therefore, the Supreme
Court has placed limitations upon the right of parents to educate their offspring93 and upon the right of mental deficients to bear children. 94 Similarly,
the right to physical privacy may be restricted in order to administer vaccinations9 5 or to conduct bodily searches.9 6

84. This is demonstrated by the very existence of the Bill of Rights. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
85. See note 17 supra.
86. In Eisenstadt the Court disapproved a distinction between married and unmarried
persons, and in Wade the plaintiff was an unmarried pregnant woman. It is, therefore, clear
that the right of privacy is personal rather than marital in nature. See text accompanying
notes 34-39 supra.
87. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), where the Court refused to
find an expectation of privacy in records that were handed to an accountant for preparation
of income tax returns.
88. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
93. See Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion
and the Rights of Minors, 23 W. Ras. L. Rav. 779 (1972).
94. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.) ("three generations of imbeciles are
enough").
95. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
96. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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The actual scope of these rights, however, has not been effectively determined by the Supreme Court, although lower courts have dealt with some
issues at length. In the area of morals legislation, for example, the state's
power to punish private acts by or between consenting adults has been questioned, but with only slight success. 9 7 Thus, the suggestion that the private
possession or use of marijuana, like pornography,98 is constitutionally protected has been unanimously rejected by the courts. 99 Similarly, statutes that
punish sodomy between consenting but unmarried adults have been upheld,100
although consensual sodomy within the marital relationship is apparently
protected. T1 ' At least one court has balked, however, at drawing a distinction
between married and unmarried persons. Faced with a communal living arrangement, the court in Moreno v. United States Department of Agriculture °a
interpreted Griswold to prohibit state interference with "the rights of privacy
and freedom of association in the home"113 rather than within the marriage.
Although Moreno was specifically concerned with the obtaining of economic
benefits, it has at least inferential application to homosexuality and sodomy
statutes, and the decision raises possibilities of protected rights in communal
habitation.1 0 4
A different aspect of the right is in the field of physical integrity, an area
most clearly delineated by the "long hair" cases. When schools have imposed
dress standards upon their students, it has been argued that the student's
freedom of expression,10 5 his right to equal protection of the laws,10 6 or his
97. "The power of legislatures to penalize such acts as prostitution, sodomy, pornographic
publication, abortion, gambling and public drunkenness (acts that do no direct harm to
anyone but consenting participants, though they may hurt the community at large) has been
questioned in the name of privacy- and with some slight success, although the Supreme
Court has usually shrunk from the arrogant position that natural law (as interpreted by five
or more of the annointed nine) must override the will of the people as expressed through
their elected representatives." Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72
COLUm. L. REv. 693, 694 (1972).
98. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
99. See, e.g., People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965); Raines v. State, 225 So.
2d 330 (Fla. 1969); State v. Kantnor,
Hawaii
493 P.2d 306 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E. 2d 898 (1969). But see Comment, The California Marijuana
Possession Statute: An Infringement on the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral Constitutional Rights?, 19 HAsT. L.J. 758 (1968).
100. E.g., Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1972) (Griswold does not pertain to sexual
conduct outside the marriage); Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1972).
101. In Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968), the
Indiana sodomy statute was found unconstitutionally overbroad in that it failed to exclude
married people from its scope. See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex.),
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Home v. State,
125 Ga. App. 40, 186 S.E.2d 542 (1971). But see Miller v. State,
Ind.
268 N.E.2d 299
(1971).
102. 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1972).
103. Id. at 314.
104. See Doss & Doss, supra note 17, at 414.
105. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 937
(1970); Komadina v. Peckham, 13 Ariz. App. 498, 478 P.2d 113 (1970); Murphy v. Pocatello
School Dist., 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971).
106. See, e.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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right of privacy 107 have been violated. Since the Supreme Court has refused to
consider this issue, however, the widely divergent views are indicative only of
the confusion in the area. Another area of physical integrity is concerned with
sterilization, either mandatorily imposed or arbitrarly denied by the state.
Compulsory sterilization of criminals and mental deficients, or "eugenic
sterilization," involves a serious challenge for the right of privacy. In Buck v.
Belllos Justice Holmes stated that society had the right to "prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."'10 9 The danger of such a
rationalization, of course, is that those who decide which people are unfit will
tend to sterilize those who disagree with them." 0 It is but a short step from
sterilizing criminals to sterilizing political dissidents and religious dissenters.1"
Denial of voluntary sterilization, although presenting less of a threat, is also a
frustrating interference with the individual's right to control his destiny in
matters of sex and procreation. 12 Because of the analogy between abortion and
sterilization, it has been argued that the right to an abortion will guarantee
the right to sterilization as well. 13
Perhaps the most important aspect of the right of privacy deals neither with
physical integrity nor legislation of morals, but with protection of the individual from psychological manipulation and governmental accumulation of
information. Writing in 1933, Aldous Huxley depicted a totalitarian state that

107. Crosson v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Yoo v. Moynihan, 28 Conn.
Supp. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (1969). Contra, Olff v. East Side Union School Dist., 445 F.2d 932
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972).
108. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
109. Id. at 207.
110. Numerous court cases deal with the sterilization of criminals, a good example of
sterilization of non-conformists. See State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931);
Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 185 App. Div. 902, 171
N.Y.S. 1094 (3d Dep't 1918); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933). It is also interesting to note that prisoners generally have been denied many protections given to other citizens,
including the right of privacy. Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M. 428, 483 P.2d 309
(1971) (fight of privacy could not be properly applied as between inmates). This emphasizes
the necessity of a strong right of privacy in this area as a deterrent to governmental manipulation, either psychological or biological, of prisoners.
I1l. The use of sterilization for purposes of genocide, of course, is all too recent an
occurrence to allow summary dismissal. The eminent historian Alan Bullock describes some
of the ordeals to which the Jews were subjected in Nazi Germany as "intense air presure and
intense cold until the 'patient's' lungs burst or until he froze to death; infliction of gas
gangrene wounds . . . and a large number of investigations of sterilization (for 'racial hygiene'), including castration and abortion." A. But.LocK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY 700
(Harper Torchbook rev. ed. 1964) (emphasis added). "The power to sterilize, if exercised,
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasis added).
112. "One of the rights of every man of sound mind is to enter into the marriage relation. Such is one of his civil rights." Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1914). See
Note, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Doctor, the Patient, and the United States Constitution,
25 U. FLA. L. REV. 327, 342-46 (1973).
113. Note, supra note 112, at 342.
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produced genetically engineered babies on an assembly line.1 4 As these babies
grew they were conditioned to behave properly through the use of "neoPavlovian" conditioning and, as adults, were given generous doses of a drug
called "soma" to keep them high and happy. Each of these possibilities genetic engineering, 115 psychological manipulation," 6 and compulsory treatment with drugs" 7 - is now within the grasp of science. The dangers of such
governmental action under the guise of therapy in the realm of prison life
have already been recognized and brilliantly analyzed:":
Currently there are no absolute limits on the exercise of the therapeutic power. Thus, while the power to alter totally and irrevocably the
individual's state of consciousness is coming within the grasp of the
therapist, no limits have been set to its exercise.

114. A. HuxleY, BRAVE NEv WOI.D (1933).
115. The possibilities are adequately summarized in A. ToFFLER, FUTRE SHOCK 197-205
(Bantam ed. 1970). See also Rorvik, Taking Life in Our Own Hands: The Test-Tube Baby
Is Coming, LooK, May 18, 1971, at 83. Exploring such possibilities as cloning and the
genetic equivalent of an arms race, Tofiler says that, in the opinion of many of the world's
leading scientists, "the clock is ticking for a 'biological Hiroshima.'" Although even governmental allowance of such genetic engineering is questionable, and has been urged as a
primary congressional concern, at least the forced compliance with a program of biological
structuring could be avoided through the right of privacy.
116. The leading behavioral psychologist in America, Professor B. F. Skinner of Harvard,
has declared that a method of "operant conditioning," based upon his work with pigeons
and rats, is necessary to curb man's destructive tendencies. B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOMs
AND DIGNITY (1971). This means that "when a bit of behavior is followed by a certain consequence, it is more likely to occur again." Id. at 27. Thus, "anything the organism does
that is followed by the receipt of food is more likely to be done again when the organism
is hungry." Id. Skinner contends that only positive consequences (or reinforcers) should be
used, a frightening possibility with a benevolent government that dispenses many positive
reinforcers (for example, welfare payments). In this connection it has been said that "the
administration of the welfare programs make[s] the individual's privacy peculiarly vulnerable
to infringement." Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law." 42 NOME DAmE LAw. 680, 701 (1967). Not only does Skinner demonstrate
the ability to manipulate human beings psychologically, he also encourages governmental use
of this so as to secure survival of the race at the expense of freedom and dignity. The result
of this was summarized in a review article pre-dating the publication:
"The trouble starts, Skinner says, with the proud belief that underlies democracy: the
notion that in each of us there is a mentalistic being.. . that is somehow free.
"He denies the existence of this Autonomous Man and of any other cognitive entity able
to claim, as Americans did in the Declaration of Independence, to hold 'unalienable rights.'
In cold passion, Skinner seeks to destroy our pretentions to the freedom and dignity whose
literature is written in brave blood." Harris, All the World's a Box, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept.
20, 1971, at 33.
117. Dr. Kenneth Clark, President of the American Psychological Association, has suggested a compulsory pill or other medication for world leaders to curb their aggressive behavior. TimE, Sept. 20, 1971, at 10. A similar suggestion has been made by philosophernovelist Arthur Koestler, HORIZON, Spring 1968, at 43.
118. N. KIrrRIE, THE RIGHTr To BE DIFFERENT 388 (1971) (emphasis added). See also
Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?"
Prisonersand Mental Patients, 45 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 616 (1972).
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The awesome moral problem of these treatments is confused by the
fact that the individuals so treated may in most cases be incapable of
objecting to the treatment after it has occurred. In his altered state, the
patient is pleasant and happy .

. .

. The new personality is reformed

and even somewhat artificial, almost as if a new soul had been transplanted into an old body.
But where has the "old" soul or personality gone ...

? Has it not in

a very real way been executed? Is the death of the body the only criteria
for the destruction of a man? Does not the personality of man need protection as much as the life of man?
In the same way that compulsory sterilization of the unfit threatens the continued existence of unpopular groups, their psychological "treatment" threatens to eliminate the diversity of human personality." 9
Although there has been no judicial response to these particular problems,
in a related field, governmental accumulation of personal information has
begun to be restricted. 120- The retention of arrest records after an acquittal or
release, for example, has been successfully challenged as an invasion of privacy
with unusually severe consequences on future employment opportunities. In
2
Eddy v. Moore'1
' it was held that refusal to expunge the records violated the
right of privacy, since no compelling state interest had been shown, and federal
courts reached a similar result in United States v. Kalish. 22 This has also been
employed to obtain release of noncriminal records that would unduly hamper
the plaintiff's life style. In Schulman v. New York City Health & Hospital
Corp.,1 23 for instance, a New York City requirement that fetal death certificates

disclose the name and address of the abortion patient was invalidated, the
court declaring that the patient had a right to maintain her anonymity where
identifimation would taint her with social stigma. The initial accumulation of
information was also halted in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young 124 where a
statute required disclosure of certain investments by public officers. Although
defended by the state as a necessary device for assuring honest government and
preventing conflicts of interest, the court found it overbroad and invalid as an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Although not precisely on point, several earlier Supreme Court cases recognized regions of individual privacy important enough to restrict first amend0
ment freedom of speech. 125 Then, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia126
the Court

119. N. KrrrRE, supra note 118, at 388-94.
120. See Note, Arrest and Credit Records: Can the Right of Privacy Survive?, 24 U. FLA.
L. REV. 681 (1972).
121. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
122. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
123. 70 Misc. 2d 1093, 35 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
124. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 446 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
125. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (right of privacy of
homeowner is superior to commercial mailer's freedom of speech); Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (right of privacy includes the "right
not to listen," which takes precedence over first amendment freedom of speech); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door salesmen is a valid
protection of right of privacy); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting
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declared that "some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern."' 12 7 Although criticized
as a severe restriction upon freedom of the press, 1 28 this was of paramount
value to the right of privacy. Where the conflict is between governmental action and individual rights, rather than between freedom of speech and the
right of privacy, it would seem that the individual right would more easily
prevail. 29 In connection with this right of privacy, it has been urged that
20
other methods of governmental invasion of privacy, such as entrapment,
be protected. The need for protection against these "subtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy" are at least as important now as in 1928.
CONCLUSION

The right of privacy is dearly in a transitional stage. Although the Supreme Court has only considered cases related to sexual functions, the lower
courts have utilized it to solve an increasing variety of problems - from morals
legislation to computer storage of private information. The greatest problem
that the right of privacy seems designed to solve, however, is the protection of
the individual from a government of almost unlimited technological power.
It is no exaggeration to say, as does Professor Kittrie, that the very death of
man as we know him is at stake:'131
Only the future will substantively define the scope of the individual's
right not to be altered .... Such limitations on the therapeutic power
may indeed hinder the "cure" of many patients. But what kind of cure
is sought by treatments which seek only to preserve the external shell of
the treated? . . . [W]hat reasonable objection could be raised against
protections against the very destruction of the essence of humanness?
If the stakes are high, however, there is nevertheless evidence that the right
of privacy is equal to the task. By analogy to the right of privacy in tort law,
which has rapidly expanded, it may be predicted that the constitutional right
will move into the challenged areas. At any rate, the Court seems remarkably
united in its conclusion that there is a fundamental right of privacy, founded
in the fourteenth amendment and protected against governmental intrusion

interference with residents' privacy by loudspeakers is valid despite infringement of the
first amendment).
126. 403 U.S. 29 (1970).
127. Id. at 48.
128. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Since the right of privacy is fundamental, the state must carry the burden of proof
in demonstrating a compelling interest in restricting it. On the contrary, the person claiming
a right of privacy as against freedom of speech (which occupies a preferred position) would
have the greater burden.
130. See L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 428
(3d ed. 1969). Numerous other rights have been urged as well. See, e.g., Comment, The
Right To Die, 7 Hous. L. Rv.654 (1970).
131. N. KrrIRrE, supra note 118, at 394 (emphasis added).
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